Sub-Saharan Migration to Europe in Times of Restriction
An empirical test of substitution effects.

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Abstract: Studies on the effects of migration policies are usually hampered by a lack of data related both to migration policies and to migration itself. In this paper, we analyze trends of migration between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe since the mid-1970s, using the unique data of the MAFE project, a major initiative that has collected data in 3 African and 6 destination countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Senegal on one hand; and Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other hand). We show that restrictive policies have failed to curb immigration into Europe and also that they had a series of unintended effects (growing irregular migration, changing routes, lesser propensity to return). The results thus confirm the “substitution effects” hypothesis. Furthermore, comparisons between sending countries show that these “substitution effects” vary according to the economic and political context at origin.

1. Introduction

The effectiveness of migration policies is a much debated question in academic circles (Czaika and De Haas 2013). In any case, studies on the impact of migration policies are still largely hampered by the lack of data regarding both international migration itself and migration policies. On one hand, International databases aimed at building quantitative indices measuring the restrictiveness of migration policies have developed in the last decade (Bjerre, Helbling et al. 2014), but they have still a limited coverage and/or are not readily accessible. On the other hand, conventional international migration data are known to suffer from a large number of limitations (Santo Tomas, Summers et al. 2009).

The lack of basic information on migration is in sharp contrast with the increasing importance of migration in the policy agenda of both sending and receiving countries. Data to study trends of migration in Africa and from African countries are crucially lacking. Census data allow estimating bilateral stocks of migrants for many countries (Parsons et al., 2007), but they give no direct information on migration flows. Administrative statistics on immigration flows are mainly limited to developed countries, and suffer from various
imperfections (Poulain et al., 2006). Statistics on outmigration flows are even less frequent, and are also seriously deficient (OECD, 2008). As a consequence, reconstructing trends in departures from African countries with existing data is challenging, and measuring returns of African migrants is next to impossible in most countries. Data on characteristics of migrants are also very limited. While census data allow describing a few characteristics (gender, education) of stocks of regular migrants in destination countries, irregular migrants are to a large extent invisible in these statistics. Finally, data on migration routes also give a partial picture, and are to a large extent based on qualitative studies focusing on irregular migration.

Since the mid-1980s, thanks to various surveys carried out by academics, Mexican migration has appeared as a major case study for socio-demographers interested in the impact of border control. They have shown, for instance, that more restrictive policies in the U.S. did not result in less departure, but in less return; and that increasing border control changed the amount and conditions of irregular migration, raising the number of border crossing attempts despite raising economic and human costs (Cornelius 2001; Massey, Durand et al. 2002). In this paper, we take advantage of a new dataset on Sub-Saharan migration – from the MAPE project – to move the geographical focus from the Mexico-US corridor to the Africa-Europe migration system. We thus enlarge the perspective from a one origin / one destination viewpoint to a multi-sited approach that takes into account three origin countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Senegal) and six destination countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK). The objective of the paper is to study the evolution of Sub-Saharan migration trends and patterns since the mid-1970s, i.e. since Europe is alleged to have adopted what can be labelled as a restrictive approach. Doing so, we do not test the effect of specific policy measures on migration, but rather look at the overall impact of a “global restrictive” context on trends of departure, destination choices and return; and on the composition of flows, especially by legal status.

After this introduction, section 2 provides a literature review both on European migration policies and Sub-Saharan migration trends. Section 3 present the data of the MAPE project and explains how they are used to compute trends of migration in various domains: propensity to out-migrate, legal status trajectories and routes of migration, propensity to return. Section 4 presents the results that are discussed in the conclusive section in light of the “substitution effects” hypotheses (De Haas 2011).

2. A Review of the Existing Evidence

A time of growing restrictions?

Since the mid-1970s, European countries have implemented migration policies to control the entry and stay of immigrants on their territory (Geddes 2003), and to encourage or force migrants to return (Cassarino 2008). In public discourses, the image of “fortress Europe” has become pervasive, even though Europe never strictly closed its borders to immigration.

After WWII, the European economic growth generated a need for labour in various sectors (mining, construction, steel). At that time, for instance, France encouraged the free movement of labour migrants originating in the former colonies and set up there recruitment offices. In most European countries, the idea was to “import labor but not
people" (Castles 2006), and the conditions of access to land were flexible (Donovon 1988). Belgium did not recruit Congolese workers, but offered visas and university grants to nationals of its former colonies in order to create an elite who could assure the management of the newly independent countries (De Schutter, 2011).

Between 1973 and 1974, in a context of economic crisis, old European destination countries put an end to the system of recruitment of foreign labour. They decreed more restrictive conditions for foreigners to access to their territory (Castles 2006). It was no longer possible to migrate to work. However, new policies related to family reunification were implemented. And entry to France for people of former colonies remained facilitated through visa exemption until 1986 (Marot, 1995). Visas exemptions were also common in Italy until 1990 (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009). Meanwhile, visa granting access to Belgian territory continued to be mandatory for Congolese.

In the 1990s, migration became an increasingly politicized topic in traditional destinations of African migrants in Europe. Conditions to migrate to Europe were tightened, be it for family, study or work reasons (Gnisci, 2008; Rea, 2007). In the 2000s, the “fight against irregular migration” became an explicit objective and a priority field of action at European level (Guiraudon 2000). With the creation of FRONTEX, an arsenal and considerable resources were put in place to try to prevent access to the EU territory to migrants who do not hold a visa (Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011). The return of undocumented migrants to their origin country became a priority (Cassarino, 2008). And procedures for obtaining refugee status were also tightened.

Finally, since the mid-1970s, the evolution of migration policies is characterized by increasing restrictions toward nationals from non-European countries. This statement must however be somehow qualified. Many irregular migrants obtained documents thanks to regularisation campaigns in many destination countries. Family migration, through reunification, constituted a significant inflow in a number of European countries, especially among Africans (Lucas, 2011). And recent initiatives in the UK, France, Italy or Spain appeared to promote circular migration, in order to favour, to a certain extent, foreign labour in sectors where needs have raised (Ruhs, 2006, Cimade, 2009). Despite a trend towards harmonization at the EU level in rules governing migration, migration policies remain in the hands of national states. In fact, the level of restrictiveness of migration policies varies according to the destination countries and categories of migrants (de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2014). In particular, there is new evidence revealing that migration policies targeting African migrants have generally become more restrictive over time, but differently according to the destination countries (Mezger and Gonzalez Ferrer 2013; Flahaux 2014) and migrants categories (Flahaux 2014).

This qualitative review of migration policies in Europe does not completely convey the image of a time of growing restrictions, as some openness parallels restrictions. Actually, drawing a complete picture of the evolution of migration policies in Europe is not an easy task. Although the European Union tends to harmonize its members’ policies, migration policies are still managed at the national level. Saying bluntly that migration policies in

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1Most examples given in this draft relate to Senegalese and Congolese migration and to the main destination countries of the related migrants. The next version will include more references to Ghanaian migration and to other receiving countries.
Europe have become increasingly restrictive since the mid-1970s remains a very general statement. A strict analysis of the evolution of migration policies would require systematic data allowing to perform cross-country comparisons as well as longitudinal analyses. Different policy databases that allow to comparing different countries are under development, but remain non available for now or presents limitations that hamper such a project (limited geographical coverage, cross-sectional data...). In Figure 1, we reproduce graphs showing the changing restrictiveness of migration policies in various sectors (labor migration, family reunification, etc.) in three European countries of interest in our study. The data come from the ImPol Database (Mezger and Gonzalez-Ferrer 2013). Despite their limited geographic coverage, they are representative of both old (France) and new destination countries (Italy and Spain). Interestingly, they take into account bilateral agreements with Senegal (one of the three origin countries of interest in our study). And They present the very great advantage of being longitudinal. A quick look at the figures confirms that restrictiveness varies by country and type of migrant. But it also shows that the major trend goes towards more restrictions, except in one domain: family reunification. And, actually, the seemingly growing openness regarding work migration since the mid-1990s actually reflects growing working rights for students and reunified migrants, and not a growing openness towards labor migration. This can be exemplified by the volumes of economic migration in France: in 1974, 130 000 workers entered France; in 1975, the number dropped to 30 000, and in 2007 they were only 12 000². All in all, characterizing the post-1975 period as a time of growing restrictions in Europe does not appear as an excessive label.

Trends and patterns of African migration

Existing research usually agree that the lack of data is a serious brake to research on trends and patterns of African migrations (Lucas, 2006). Existing reviews mainly rely on international databases on stocks of migrants, or flows to OECD countries. These sources allow describing some of the main characteristics and changes of African migration, but, as discussed later, lack details on trends, patterns and routes of African migrations.

First, African migrants mainly live in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2000, around 70% of the 17.5 millions African migrants lived in sub-Saharan African, and often in neighboring countries (Schoumaker and Schoonvaere, 2012; Lessault and Beauchemin, 2009 ; Özden et al., 2010). This varies depending on the countries: in general, migrants from less developed countries tend to stay within Africa, whereas those from more developed African countries are more likely to go to OECD countries (Lucas, 2006). Intercontinental migration from Africa is largely directed towards Europe (Lucas, 2006). Even though the United States and Canada have attracted a growing number of migrants over the last decades (Zeleza, 2002; Zlotnik, 1993), Europe remains by far the major destination of sub-Saharan migrants leaving Africa. In 2000, the number of sub-Saharan African migrants living in Europe was close to 3 million, almost one million greater than in 1990 (Lucas, 2006). This represents around 55% of African migrants living out of Africa (18% in North America). This concentration in Europe (and to a large extent in France and the United Kingdom) partly results from historical ties –former

² Source: Beauchemin, Borrel et al. (forthcoming) and http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Info-ressources/Documentation/Tableaux-statistiques/L-admission-au-sejour-les-titres-de-sejour
colonial powers are European countries -, from the geographical proximity, as well as from economic, political and linguistic reasons (de Haas, 2007).

Not only has the “stock” of migrants increased steadily for 50 years; but the annual flows of migrants have also increased significantly since the 1960s, despite restrictive policies. According to Zlotnik (1993) (legal) migration flows from Sub-Saharan Africa to six Western European countries (Belgium, Germany, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden) grew from about 13,000 migrants per year in the early 1960s to nearly 50,000 in the late 1980s. More recent data indicate that entries from Sub-Saharan Africa into these countries were over 100,000 legal migrations per year in the early 2000s (Migration Policy Institute, 2007). Adding migrants the other major European destinations (Spain, Italy, Portugal), well above 100 000 sub-Saharan African migrants enter Europe legally per year.

The 1990s was a turning point in many respects. The end of the Cold War, and the “fear of invasion” triggered by the opening of the Iron Curtain (Streiff-Fénart, 2012, p.viii), led to the tightening of immigration policies in Europe. At the same time asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa (which are usually not included in statistics of legal migration, unless they are accepted as legal migrants), also increased significantly. In the same six European countries as above (for which data is readily available), asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa were just over 10 000 per year in the early 1980s, but were over 60 000 per year in 2001 (Migration policy Institute, 2007). The extent of illegal migration is notoriously difficult to estimate, but observers suggest that illegal migration between Africa and Europe has also increased significantly, especially since the 1990s (de Haas, 2006). Overall, the number of migrants arriving in Europe has increased, and is in the several hundred thousand per year. Despite this growth, the populations of African migrants remain relatively small in most countries. For instance, they represent approximately 1% of the total population in France and in Belgium (Lessault and Beauchemin, 2009; Schoumaker and Schoonvaere, 2012). Characteristics of African migrants

Limited information is available on the characteristics of sub-Saharan African migrants to Europe (in terms of age, gender, qualification, skills...) and on their evolution over time (Hatton, 2004; Lucas, 2006). The existing literature indicates that the educational levels and qualifications of migrants are usually higher than those of non-migrants in the region of departure and that international migrants do not come from the poorest strata of African countries (Lucas, 2006). International database also show the brain drain in Sub-Saharan Africa is higher than in most other regions of the world (Lucas, 2006). This varies across departure countries and has also changed over time. In the case of DR Congo for instance, Sumata (2002, p.16) suggests that, while migration between DR Congo and Belgium until the 1980s was mainly a “middle-class” phenomenon, in the 1990s, the profiles diversified as a result of the political and economic crises. Starting in the 1990s, “both rich and poor people had no choice but to seek political asylum” (Sumata, 2002, p.16). According to some researchers, women are also increasingly represented among African migrants, notably to Europe (Van Moppes, 2006; Adepoju, 2004). Yet, little empirical evidence has been produced on this topic. The gender composition of undocumented migrants and its evolution is much more difficult to ascertain with current data.
Returns and circulation

The lack of individual and longitudinal data in both countries of destination (on migrants) and origin (on returnees) is clearly a handicap in the measurement and understanding of return migration and circulation. Not only is it not possible to estimate the level and trends of return migration, but it is also not possible to measure the duration spent in the destination country before returning. Even aggregate data – such as data on emigration flows from European countries - are insufficient to study patterns of return migration.

Returns of course do occur, and many European countries have tried to encourage them through return programmes (Dustmann, 1996). The extent and trends of returns among African migrants is hard to estimate with existing data. Scattered evidence suggests that return migration – at least from some European countries to some African countries – has decreased recently. Increasingly restrictive policies are thought to have stimulated illegal migration and at the same time decreased returns (de Haas, 2007). For instance, out-migration statistics published by nationality (but not by destination) in Belgium suggest - for Congolese migrants - that the likelihood of return migration has diminished since the 1990s (Schoonvaere, 2010). Data also suggest that a large proportion of returns is made up of spontaneous returns. Assisted returns are relative rare, as illustrated by the REAB programme (the programme of assisted voluntary return implemented by the IOM) in Belgium (IOM, 2007): the number of returns of undocumented sub-Saharan Africa migrants was between 100 and 200 per year between 2002 and 2006 (including rejected asylum seekers and non-asylum seekers). Removals of undocumented migrants – although not insignificant – also seem to affect a limited proportion of migrants in Europe. For instance, according to Eurostat, less than 800 Senegalese migrants and less than 2000 Congolese migrants were forced to leave Europe in 2011 (expulsions and assisted returns combined) (Flahaux, 2012).

Migrant circulation is given increasing attention in academic research as well as among policy-makers (Constant and Massey, 2002; Hugo, 2003; Vertovec, 2007). There is, however, very little quantitative empirical literature on this topic, notably because of the lack of longitudinal individual data (Constant and Zimmermann, 2003). The prevalence of the phenomenon is unknown, as is the trend in circulation of migrants and the characteristic of circular migrants. Qualitative research on Congolese migrants in France and Belgium suggest that migrants develop strategies of circulation between Europe and Africa (Macgaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000).

The routes of African migrants to Europe

The motives of migration and the legal status at entry in Europe of African migrants are diverse, and so are the routes they use to reach Europe. Contrary to popular knowledge, African migrants usually enter their destination country in a legal way (de Haas, 2007). Even among undocumented migrants, clandestine entry is thought to be relatively unimportant: significant numbers enter legally and overstay their visas, and rejected asylum-seekers who do not leave the country are another major category of undocumented migrants (Collyer, 2006; Düvell, 2006). Although some information on the way African migrants enter Europe and on the changes of their legal status over time was collected for some African countries

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in the Push-Pull project in the 1990s (Schhorl, Heering et al., 2000; İçduygu and Ünalan, 2001) more recent and detailed data is not available.

The current literature suggests – although in an impressionistic way - that a wide variety of means of transportation and itineraries are used by migrants entering Europe (Van Moppes, 2006; Schapendonk, 2012). Some research indicate that people entering Europe legally come mainly by air, but that a large share of migrants entering illegally travels by sea, whether by cargo ships or by small boats, mainly towards Italy and Spain. In the early 2000s, the major departure areas of sub-Saharan (illegal) migrants were thought to be Northern Morocco (to Ceuta and Melilla and Southern Spain); Libya and Tunisia (to Lampedusa, Sicily, Malta...); and Africa’s West Coast (Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal) for migrants going to the Canary Islands (de Haas, 2006; Hamood, 2006; Van Moppes, 2006). Senegalese migrants tend to leave either directly from Senegal by boat to the Canary Islands, or head northwards to Mauritania and Morocco. Ghanaians are thought to reach Africa’s West Coast through Bamako and Dakar, or to cross Sahara to Morocco or Libya (Van Moppes, 2006). As an illustration of the long and complex itineraries followed by migrants, Congolese are also thought to be common among migrants moving to Europe through North Africa (Collyer, 2006). Congolese also travel through countries further south (South Africa, Angola) to reach Europe by air (Sumata, 2002).

Migration itineraries shift over time, in response notably to tightened controls and changing policies in transit countries (Düvell, 2006; Väyrynen, 2003; Gabrielli, 2012). In the 1990s, crossing the strait of Gibraltar was a major itinerary between Africa and Europe, but the intensification of controls since 2002 has diverted flows of migrants towards Spain’s Canary Islands (Alschler, 2005). More recently, departures from Africa’s West Coast seem to have moved further South (Düvell, 2006). Itineraries may also change in response to visa policies in transit countries. For instance, the Turkish visa regime for sub-Saharan African countries was changed in 2005, making migration to Europe through Turkey more difficult (Brewer and Yükseker, 2006). Evidence on organization of travels of African migrants to Europe is also scattered. Van Moppes (2006) mentions that more than half of illegal migrants reaching Europe have had “help” from smugglers at least at some stage of their trip (eg. to cross the sea or the Sahara), but these estimates are based on very shaky evidence.

All in all, available data in migrant stocks and migrant flows allow drawing broad patterns, but lack details on migration trends from African countries, on the profiles of migrants, on their motives, and more generally on the way they travel. While case studies provide in-depth data on some topics and some specific population, they give a partial view of African migrations.

The MAFE data offer a middle ground between the large scale database (that lack details) and the cases studies (from which generalization are not possible). By including different origin and destination countries, the MAFE data allow identifying diversity and country-specific results, as well as showing more general trends among several countries.

**Congolese, Ghanaian and Senegalese Migration**

This section presents a brief history of migration in the three African MAFE countries.

Four distinct phases in the history of international migration in Ghana can be distinguished (Anarfi et al. 2003). Up until the late 1960s Ghana was relatively economically
prosperous and was a country of net-immigration, particularly attracting migrants from the West African sub-region (Twum-Baah et al. 1995). During this time emigration from Ghana was minimal; most emigrants were students or professionals who left to the UK or other English-speaking countries. In the second phase, beginning in the mid-1960s, Ghana became a country of net-emigration (Twum-Baah et al. 1995). The economic crisis contributed both to a decline in immigration to Ghana and an increase in outmigration (Anarfi et al. 2003). The majority of emigrants were professionals such as teachers, lawyers and administrators who went to other African countries (Nigeria, Uganda, Botswana, Zambia) (Anarfi et al. 2003). The third phase started in the early 1980s, a time when the economy of Ghana was growing at a negative rate (Anarfi et al. 2003), and was marked by two shifts in migration patterns: other sectors of society, not only professionals, began to migrate *en masse* from the southern parts of Ghana and migratory flows spread to more distant destinations in Europe, North America and North Africa (especially Libya). Compounding the situation, Nigeria expelled all foreigners from its territory including 1.2 million Ghanaians in 1983 and a further 700,000 Ghanaians in 1985 (Anarfi et al. 2003). It is thought many of those expelled sought greener pastures overseas. In the fourth phase, migration from Ghana to overseas destinations continued steadily so that in the 1990s Ghanaians came to constitute one of the main groups of ‘new African diasporas’ (Koser 2003). Since the mid-1990s there exists some evidence of return migration to Ghana as a result of an improving economy in comparison to neighbouring West African countries to which many Ghanaians migrated; but also due to the tightening of immigration laws and restrictions on travelling abroad, particularly to European countries that require the possession of valid travel and employment documents (Anarfi et al. 2003; Twum-Baah et al. 1995). Furthermore, Ghana regained political stability in 1992 when democratic elections were held after a decade of military dictatorship. In general though, there is relatively little data on international return migration to Ghana, both in terms of numbers and the impact on the development of the country at large (Black et al. 2003a).

In DR Congo, the country’s independence in 1960 marked a turning-point in the history of migration in several respects. While some Congolese migrated to Belgium in the first half of the twentieth century, migration to Europe did not truly take off until the 1960s. At that time, most migrants were members of the country's elite who went to Europe to study (Kagné and Martiniello 2001; Schoonvaere, 2010), and returned to the Congo after completing their education. The deterioration of the economic and political situation in the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, led to an increase in flows, to a decrease in return migration (Schoonvaere, 2010) and to a diversification of the destinations and profiles of Congolese migrants, with more females and less educated migrants (Demart 2008; Schoumaker, Vause, Mangalu, 2011). Migrants’ way of entry and itineraries also became more diverse. Firstly, many Congolese migrants started coming to Europe as asylum seekers (Schoonvaere, 2010). Secondly, it would appear that migration trajectories became more complex. Illegal immigration developed and several studies indicate that it has become a key component of Congolese migration (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000; Ngoie Tshibambe, 2008), though its scale has not been documented. Destinations also changed. France gradually became the preferred destination, and other countries, notably the United Kingdom and Germany, also attracted growing numbers of Congolese migrants (Ngoie Tshibambe and Vwakyanakazi 2008). Major changes in the patterns of migration towards Africa were also observed in the late 1980s and the 1990s. In the 1990s, and especially after the abolition of apartheid, South Africa became a leading destination country (Steinberg,
Existing data on return migration from Europe show a downtrend in returns and a low proportion of intentions to return. Using Belgian administrative data, Schoonvaere (2010) showed a substantial decrease in returns among migrants who arrived in the 1990s. Based on a small survey among 122 Congolese migrants in Paris, Lututala (2006) showed that three-quarters of migrants intend to stay in France, and that only 14% intend to return permanently to RD Congo (12% are undecided).

The history of the Senegalese migration began in the early twentieth century with navigators, demobilized "tirailleurs" (soldiers) and early traders who settled in the countries of French West Africa and, to a lesser extent in France (Lalou, Robin, Ndiaye 2000). These flows intensified from the mid-1960s, to countries of the sub-region (Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana), notably with the economic success of cocoa and coffee, as well as to more distant flourishing economies (Gabon). The recruitment of labor in the automobile industry in France (Pison, Hill, Cohen, Foote 1997; Robin 1996) also stimulated migration to Europe. At that time, the presence of Senegalese in France was mainly composed of single men who left their families in their home villages (Petit 2002). The stop to labour migration in the mid-1970s, and the promotion of family reunification in Europe, are thought to have contributed to more permanent settlements (Robin, Lalou and Ndiaye 2000). The late 1980s were marked by a large emigration (Tall 2001) and a diversification of destination countries (Ma Mung 1996). Traditional destinations within Africa lost their attractivity, as a result of economic and political troubles (Robin, Lalou and Ndiaye 2000), and the Senegalese emigration to Africa ran out of steam (Ba, 2006). France continued hosting Senegalese migrants, but other Western countries (notably Italy and Spain) have attracted increasing shares of migrant from Senegal. Senegalese migration has also received a significant media and policy attention due to the large numbers of Senegalese migrants arriving by sea on the shores or islands of Europe (Pastore et al., 2006; Oumar Ba & Choplin, 2005). However, existing studies on Senegalese migrants’ routes are mostly monographic and thematic (Antoine & Sow, 2000, Fall 1997; Sakho and Dial, 2010). Data on return migration is also limited. Robin et al. (2000) indicate that the majority of Senegalese return migrants are those who had migrated to neighboring countries such as Gambia and Mauritania (Robin et al., 2000), suggesting return migration from Europe are more limited.

3. Data and Method

The data used in this paper come from the MAFE project (Migration between Africa and Europe). The MAFE project is a multi-site project on international migration. Its objectives and questionnaires were inspired by the Mexican Migration Project (Beauchemin 2012). The objectives of the MAFE project are to measure trends and patterns of migration, causes of departures and returns, and consequences of international migration on economic and family outcomes. The MAFE project includes both household and individual data, collected in cities of three sub-Saharan countries (Accra and Kumasi in Ghana, Dakar in Senegal and Kinshasa in DR Congo) and in six destination countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland).
Netherlands, Spain, UK). The same questionnaires were used in all the settings, making data entirely comparable across countries⁴.

The MAFE Surveys

Household surveys were conducted in sending countries (in 2008/2009) among representative samples of households (1,187 in Accra/Kumasi; 1,141 in Dakar; 1,576 in Kinshasa)⁵. Data was collected on all the current members of the household, as well as on a series of people related to the household. Data on international migration was collected with 5 questions (Figure 1): (1) whether or not an individual had lived for at least one year out of the origin country, (2) the year of the first departure for at least one year to another country, (3) the destination country of the first migration, (4) whether or not the person had returned for at least one year, and if yes (5) the year of the first return. The data were collected for each current member of the household, as well as for all children of the head of household, regardless of their place of residence at the time of the survey (in the household, elsewhere in the country, abroad), and including deceased children. This information will be used to reconstruct trends following a retrospective approach (see below).

Biographic surveys are also used in this paper, mainly to describe routes of migration and legal trajectories. Biographic data were collected among individuals aged 25 and over in the three origin countries (non-migrants and return migrants, around 1500 individuals per country selected in the households) and in the six European destination countries (current migrants, around 200 migrants per destination country). Full migration histories were collected, along with employment histories, marriage histories, birth histories. Legal status trajectories were collected; at any time the data thus indicates whether migrants had the right to stay and/or work. A full module was also dedicated to the collection of information on the routes followed by migrants when they left their origin country: who they travelled with, means of transportation, list of transit countries, etc.

Reconstructing migration trends

The retrospective information contained in the MAFE data are used to reconstruct trends in migration. The biographic data allow to studying the changing migrants’ characteristics by period of departure. It especially allows to studying legal status trajectories (Vickstrom 2013) and to reconstructing complete migration routes, including short and long stays in intermediate countries, for Ghanaian, Senegalese and Congolese migrants currently living in Europe. A migration route is defined here as the succession of countries through which people passed before reaching the ‘final’ destination, i.e. their country of residence at the time of the survey. Because of the way data were collected people currently ‘in transit’ between Africa and Europe at the time of the survey are not included in our samples. The MAFE surveys thus provide a partial picture of the phenomenon, describing routes of people who succeeded to reach Europe. They are furthermore limited to 6 destination countries and 3 origin countries. Despite these

⁴ The questionnaires are available at: http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/

The household data allow reconstructing trends in departures and returns of migrants by computing retrospective rates of migration (Schoumaker and Beauchemin 2014). Age-specific migration probabilities are computed by dividing the number of migrants (among heads’ children) at a given age during a given year, by the number of heads’ children of that age who had not yet migrated by that year. These probabilities are estimated using event history models including both ages and time periods as independent variables. They are then transformed into indicators that are more easily interpreted. The indicator used here is a lifetime probability of migration, and measures the probability that a person would do at least one international migration during his/her adult life (18-70), if the age-specific probabilities of migration observed during a given time-period (i.e. 1990-1999) were applied to people from age 18 to age 70. This is the ‘synthetic cohort’ principle commonly used for other types of demographic indicators (period life expectancy, period age-specific fertility rates). Trends in returns are reconstructed in a similar way. Probabilities of return are computed (among migrants) using event history models with time periods and duration of migration as independent variables. The coefficients of the models are then transformed into a synthetic indicator measuring the probability of returning within 10 years of first departure for separate periods. Because the population at risk of returning is only composed of those who left, the sample size for returns are much smaller, and indicators are less reliable.

Apart from problems of small samples in some cases, these techniques of reconstructing migration trends from retrospective are not free from biases. One possible bias is due to the fact that, for people not living in the household, data are collected from proxy respondents. Some migrants may not be declared, and data on those who are declared may be inaccurate. Another possible bias stems from the fact that some entire households may have migrated abroad, and as a result these emigrants may not be recorded as emigrants (the head or spouse may still be mentioned by their parents, but the children would not be mentioned). On the other hand, some children may be reported twice, since they can be reported separately by parents who live separately. Finally, only the first migration is included in the reconstruction of trends, and this may lead to underestimating recent migration. Even though biases are inevitable, they compensate each other to some extent, are considered sufficiently small to provide acceptable estimates.

4. Results

Trends of departure and the changing geography of destinations

Out-migration, whatever the destination, did not evolve uniformly in our three countries of interest (Figure 2). The propensity to migrate out of Senegal remained pretty stable; migration have sharply progressed out of Ghana at the turn of the 1990s and stabilized afterwards; whereas out-migration continuously expanded from DR Congo. As a result, the differences across countries in migration probabilities have also changed

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6 For the sake of simplicity, we will use the name of the countries. However, the data were collected in cities are not representative of the countries.
considerably. Lifetime probabilities of migration were higher in Senegal than in the other countries before 1990. In the more recent period (2000-2008), on the contrary, Senegal is the country where out-migration is the less likely. Given the latest rates of migration, less than one adult out of five (between 18 and 70) is likely to migrate out of Senegal, against one out of three out of Congo, Ghana standing in between. Whatever the ranking, it appears that international mobility is a central component of people’s life in these countries. Examining trends by destinations is necessary to better understand these changes.

Global trends in departure mask major shifts in destinations (Figure 2). Senegal and Ghana have both witnessed an increase in migration propensities to Europe (and for Ghana, to North America), accompanied by a decrease in migrations to Africa. In contrast, Congolese migration to Europe did not really take off, but migrations to other African countries exploded. As a result of these diverging trends by destination, the geography of migrations has considerably changed. In Ghana, the share of migrations to Europe has grown from around 20% to 50%, and from 40% to 60% in Senegal. In contrast, the share of European migration dwindled to less than 20% in Congo (Figure 3). These diverging results suggest that restrictive policies in Europe are not the main migration driver and that context at origin and in alternative destinations play an important role in migration decisions.

As discussed in the literature review, the boom in out-migration in DR Congo resulted from the deep deterioration of the domestic context. This civil war undoubtedly fueled out-migration to Europe, as migrants could apply as asylum seekers, but this trend was only temporary. After 2000 and the restauration of a more peaceful context, the propensity to out-migrate to Europe reduced drastically, while it continued to progress sharply to African destinations, to which Congolese adults where 6 times more likely to head than to Europe. This happened because new opportunities opened up in the region. The end of the apartheid regime (1994) gave a boost to migration to South Africa from the mid-1990s (Steinberg, 2005; Sumata, 2002). The end of the Angola war in the early 2000s and the unprecedented economic development in the country also attracted many Congolese. As a result of the competing opportunities in Africa, Congolese migration to Europe did not really take off, even though Congolese migrants had the possibility to apply as asylum seekers.

On the contrary, opportunities in Africa for Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants have reduced sensibly since the 1970s. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Nigeria used to be a major destination for Ghanaians. The oil boom attracted many West African migrants (Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1992), and notably Ghanaian migrants. The deterioration of the economic context led to massive expulsions of immigrants from Nigeria (in 1983 and 1985). Nigeria was no longer an option for Ghanaians, and no countries in the region offered significantly better opportunities. As a result, Europe and North America became the preferred destinations of Ghanaian migrants when the economic and political context deteriorated. Senegalese were also many to migrate to flourishing economies in Francophone Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, notably Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. These countries were also hit by economic crises and developed anti-immigrant policies in the 1990s. Most other countries in the regions were experiencing economic difficulties, and no other African destination offered an attractive alternative. European countries became the first choice for Senegalese migrants. Even though migration was becoming more difficult because of increasingly

7 South Africa did attract some Senegalese migrants from the mid-1990s (Robin et al., 2001), but the bulk of them moved to Europe.
restrictive policies, the lack of opportunities in African destinations and the growing demand for cheap labor – notably in Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy) - contributed fuelling migration from Sub-Saharan Africa. Italy and Spain progressively became major destinations of Senegalese migrants. Ghanaian migrants increasingly migrated to the UK, as well as to the US and to new European destinations (Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands).

Growing irregularity and New Routes of Migration

As mentioned in the literature, that the period under study in this paper can be labelled as a “period of restrictions” does not mean that legal migration to Europe was not possible at that time: family reunification and asylum seeking became two major channels of entry into Europe after old destinations put an official end to labour migration. The literature suggests this kind of “categorical substitution” (De Haas 2011) from a legal channel to another is not the only shift in the nature of African migration to Europe: although few data are available to attest it\(^8\), irregular entry is also supposed to have grown. In this section, we measure to what extent irregular migration developed over the last decades. Legal status and routes followed by migrants are the main variables of interest.

Before discussing the results, one should note that irregular migration is not easily defined. A typical image of irregular migrants is the one of people crossing the sea from Africa and reaching Spain or Italy in small boats or pirogues. Migrants may enter legally in a country (for instance with a visa tourist), and overstay their visas. In this section, we consider as irregular migrants all the migrants who mentioned they did not have a residence permit at some point in time during their first year in the destination country. It will not only include people entering clandestinely, but also people entering a country legally and overstaying their visas.

Figure 4 shows that there has been an increase of irregular migration for migrants from all three countries. However, the situations and evolutions are very diverse. The percentages are quite high for Congolese and Senegalese people (30-35% of irregular migrants in the 2000s), and have increased significantly since the 1980s. In contrast, percentages are much lower for Ghanaian migrants, where less than 10% of the migrants were undocumented their first year of stay in Europe. Overall, these data provides clear evidence of growing irregular migration. This actually reflects the fact that irregular migration is more frequent in new destinations (Table 1). How come? Is it the result of a higher geographical proximity of these countries with Africa? While the explanation could apply to Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Spain, where irregular migration reached indeed great levels (about 40% to 50% at arrival among Senegalese migrants), it does not hold when considering the other countries of interest in this study (irregular migration reaches similar levels among Congolese migrants in the UK). The tolerance of governments towards irregular migration offers an alternative explanation. It is true, for instance, that Spain and Italy applied larger regularization schemes than France (Brick 2011). It may have

\(^8\) For instance, a higher number of apprehensions does not necessarily reflect the fact that undocumented migrants are more numerous: it simply shows that the police is more active (and/or efficient) to track them.
influenced Senegalese migrants in their primary or secondary destination choice. But, the same reasoning does not apply to our other groups of interest. The Netherlands has a greater proportion of irregular Ghanaian migrants than the UK, even though it regularized a smaller amount of migrants. And the UK and Belgium regularized, through programs, approximately the same amount of migrants between 1996 and 2007, which does not explain the difference in the proportion of irregular migrants upon arrival. Finally, the higher proportion of undocumented migrants may reflect the fact that migrants have no or less networks (i.e., prior migrants) in new destination countries to rely on to organize a legal migration, for instance through family reunification.

Unsurprisingly, migrants in new receiving countries are not only more likely to be irregular, they are also more likely to have been through longer routes. Around 30-45% of migrants in new destinations had transited through other countries, while the proportion is rather around 25% in traditional destinations (Table 1). These differences between old and new countries of immigration reflect the fact that migration routes have grown in complexity and diversity over time (Figure 5). For instance, 90% of the Ghanaians arriving in the UK before the 1990s used only two routes: either directly or through Nigeria. In the years 2000, six different routes covered 90% of the cases, and 6 routes also covered 90% of the cases in the years 2000. Senegalese in France used only 3 routes in the 1980s, 8 in the 1990s, and 6 in the years 2000s. The number of routes of Congolese migrants (to Belgium and to the UK) is very diverse and has also greatly increased. The greater diversity among Congolese probably partly reflects to some extent the greater distance to Europe as well as the larger size of the country (and hence the greater number of possible routes) – but may also be linked to the more individualistic nature of Congolese migration. The routes in the years 2000 were also different from the routes in the years 1990s.

Interestingly, transit countries are not exclusively situated in Africa. Overall, people are as likely to transit through African countries as through European countries, except among Senegalese migrants in Italy, and Ghanaians in the Netherlands, more likely to come through other European countries. Transits through other European countries are more frequent for migrants living in new destinations than for those living in traditional destinations. Around 18% of Senegalese in Italy passed through France, and one Ghanaian out of seven in the Netherlands came through Germany or Italy (very few through the UK). France and Belgium are also two common transit countries among Congolese in the UK, illustrating the “Euro-Congolese” wave of migrants (Pachi, Barrett and Garbin, 2010). These results indicate that new destinations are clearly not the gates to old destinations. In any case, it remains that most migrants coming from Africa to Europe follow a direct route, whatever their destination country (Table 1 and Table 2).

Finally, how do African migrants travel to Europe? Three options are possible: land (mainly through Turkey and Greece), air, and sea. The large majority of African migrants travel by air. Most of them in fact simply flew from their country of origin to their destination. However, our data also show that arrivals by sea are not a marginal

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9 A number of Senegalese migrants arrived in France before moving to Spain or Italy. To be shown in a next version of the paper.

10 To be shown in a next version of the paper.

11 (1) Directly from Ghana, (2) through Germany, (3) through Nigeria, (4) through Togo, (5) through Switzerland, (6) through Nigeria-Germany-France.
phenomenon among Senegalese migrants. In Italy, boat arrivals tended to decrease over time from about 25% in 1975-1989 to 10% in 2000-2008 (Figure 6). Spain experienced a reversal trend: the phenomenon started in the 1990s and culminated in the following decade: in the 2000s, almost 40% all Senegalese migrants arrived in Spain by boat. These results illustrate the tendency and ability of migrants to adapt their routes according to the changing geography of border enforcement (Streiff-Fénart and Segatti, 2012). We have here a typical case of “spatial substitution effect” (De Haas 2011), whereby migrants shift their original destination with a more open (or less controlled) country: when Libyan shores started to be controlled (following an agreement between the Italian government and the Kadhafi regime), migrants reoriented their trajectories towards new crossing places.

**Trends of return**

Another possible side and unintended effect of restrictive migration policies is that they tend to reduce return migration, which was coined by De Haas (2011) as a “reverse flow substitution effect”. This hypothesis rests on two rationales. First, migrants are all the more adverse to return that the possibilities to re-migrate are restricted. Return projects are linked to the perspectives of reinsertion in the home society, which entail some risks (migrants may experience re-adaptation problems upon return). The possibility to re-migrate acts as a sort of insurance against failure upon return. Immigration restrictive policies, that impede this possibility, tend thus to discourage return. The other rationale is that restrictive policies tend to augment migrants vulnerability (e.g., they make them more likely to be undocumented), which delays the migrants target achievement, and thus reduces the odds of return.

We used the household MAFE data on heads’ children to compute trends of return to origin countries. Due to limited sample sizes, the estimates are weakly significant (Figure 7)\(^{12}\). They are however indicative of trends that can also been observed in the declarations of return intentions computed with the biographic MAFE data\(^{13}\). A first important result is that, on average, returns from African countries have been more frequent than from Europe. This may reflect the difference in the intensity of border control in the two regions: while Europe has increasingly implemented restrictive immigration policies, migration within Africa is subject to much less control. In particular, Senegal and Ghana are part of ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States), a regional organization of fifteen countries, founded in 1975, which mission is to promote economic integration, including through free movement of persons.

Trends in return from Europe did not evolve uniformly for Congolese, Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants. While the propensity to return remained stable among Senegalese migrants over time, it declined drastically for Congolese and Ghanaian migrants between the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1975 and 1989, returns concerned almost 40% of the Congolese migrants in Europe, whereas only 5% of them returned within 10 years in the following decades. Similarly, returns have dropped from around 50% to 10% for Ghanaians over the

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\(^{12}\) Note that other estimates where computed using an alternative method in previous publications. Although differences between return from Africa and Europe were also marked in these previous computations, the results presented here tend to show lower levels of return.

\(^{13}\) To be shown in a next version of the paper.
same period; but this strong decline was however followed by a rebound in the years 2000\textsuperscript{14}. These fluctuations follow the evolution of contexts at origin and destination. In both countries, the decline in return corresponds to a period of economic crisis and political troubles (civil war in DRC and dictatorship in Ghana). This time was clearly not favorable to any return in these countries. The democratization of Ghana in the early 1990s, the improved political stability, and Ghana’s economic recovery have probably played a role in attracting return migrants from Europe in the years 2000. As a matter of fact, returnees in Ghana reintegrated well in the labor market (Castagnone, Mezger et al. 2013).

Changes in the composition of the migrant populations also contribute to explain changing trends in return migration. The profile of Congolese migrants dramatically changed at the turn of the 1980s. Before and since independence, most Congolese migrants were members of the country’s elite and went to Europe to study or do professional/training missions in big firms or the administration with the intention to return to Congo after completing their task (Kagné and Martiniello 2001)\textsuperscript{15}. When the country entered its period of economic, political and military turmoil, Congolese migration became less selective: migrants came from less favored socioeconomic categories (Sumata 2002; Schoumaker, Vause et al. 2010), the proportion of women also progressed in migration to Europe, partly in relation to family reunification (Vause 2012). In short, Congolese migrants who used to be on circular migrants started to be settlers.

5. Conclusions

The objective of this paper was to review new evidence on patterns of migration between Sub-Saharan African and Europe in times or restrictions. Even though the notion that EU members apply uniformly restrictive policies can be contested, our review of literature suggests that the label “times of restrictions” for the post-1975 period is accurate in the European context. Against this context, we used a unique dataset to compute trends of migration in various domains that are usually overlooked due to the lack of quantitative data: propensity to out-migrate, legal status at entry, routes of migration and propensity to return. Doing so, we were able to show the relevance of the concept of “substitution effects” proposed by De Haas (2011). He hypothesized that migrants’ agency explains at least partly the failure of policies aimed at curbing immigration. The hypothesis is that migrants adapt their behaviour to new governmental rules to pursue their own migration objective. De Haas distinguished four types of adaptation leading to four corresponding “substitution effects”.

We were unable to test “the inter-temporal substitution effect” or “now or never migration” that occurs when “migration surges in the expectation of a future tightening of migration regulations” (2011, p.27). Without being able to show precisely this anticipation effect, we showed however that the propensity to migration from Africa to Europe tended to progress over time, albeit not uniformly, and with some cases of decrease and stagnation.

\textsuperscript{14} Actually, trends computed by single years indicate that returns starting decreasing in the early–mid 1980s and increased from the early-mid 1990s (results not shown).

\textsuperscript{15} In 1992, 37% of all Congolese entered since less than 13 years had left Belgium, while the proportion was only 20% for Moroccan migrants. Note that the proportions include both migrants who declared their departure and migrants who were eliminated from the municipal registers (Schoonvaere, 2010).
Note however that stagnation in out-migration rates can however lead to higher volumes of out-migrants in contexts of demographic growth.

In complement, we found some support to the hypothesis of “Spatial substitution effects”, that occur when migrants switch destination countries to target those which apply less restrictive measures. This phenomenon is at play in the reorientation of migrants from old to new destinations, for instance from France to Italy or Spain as far as Senegalese migrants are concerned. More specifically, it was also at play when Senegalese migrants who entered Europe by boat switched from Italy to Spain.

As a response to restrictions, the composition of the migrant Sub-Saharan population also changed. As it is already quite well documented with conventional data (e.g., administrative registers on admissions), we did not come back in our results on the « categorical substitution effect » consisting in shifts in legal channels of entry, from labor migration to family reunification or asylum. We rather focused on the shift to irregular migration, confirming that the proportion of irregular migrants grew over time, to reach significant levels as high as around 30% of all entries of Senegalese and Congolese migrants.

Finally, evidence also confirmed the “reverse flow substitution effect”, whereby restrictions on immigration actually discourage return migration. On the one hand, the difference in return rates from Africa vs. Europe suggests that contexts of easy (if not free) circulation (as in Africa) are more favourable to return than contexts of tight border control (as in Europe). On the other hand, the decreasing rates of return among Congolese and Ghanaians, while policies became more restrictive in Europe also tends to support the hypothesis of the “reverse flow substitution effect”.

Even though our analyses are not representative of the whole Sub-Saharan Africa, they present the advantage of being related to three different origin countries with varied background contexts while most previous studies were based on only one origin country. They thus allow to qualifying the impacts on migration of policies defined in destination countries. We did not only show that restrictions do not succeed to curb migration and have unintended effects, we also showed that the origin context is of tremendous importance to explain trends of departure and return. The surge of migration to Europe from Congo and Ghana in the 1990s is certainly linked to the deep deterioration of the economic and political situations in these countries, whereas Senegal – that displayed a constant rate of out-migration to Europe – experienced a period of remarkable stability. Similarly, the differences in return trends among Ghanaian and Congolese are attributable to differences in the local prospects of reintegration at origin.

Finally, we were able to show that a certain number of common wisdoms regarding African migration are not grounded in evidence. The perception of a invasion of Sub-Saharan in Europe is not comforted by trends in departure. The majority of African migrants enter legally in Europe. Even though images of pirogues and boats overloaded with migrants caught the attention of the public and policy makers, sea routes do not prevail in African migration to Europe. And, in statistical terms, Mediterraneans countries are not the gates of African migrants on their way to other destinations; migrants rather tend to enter through countries where they have acquaintances, i.e. old countries of immigration, before moving to alternative destinations.
1. Immigration policy concerning irregular entry/residence
   - Subset 1: Readmission agreements signed/in force with Senegal; readmission agreements signed/in force with main transit countries; maximum duration of stay in administrative retention centres
   - Subset 2: Extraordinary regularisation (application process ongoing); permanent regularisation
2. Short stay entry variable
   - Subset 1: Tourist visa exemptions; motivation of visa refusals
   - Subset 2: Requirements: economic resources requirements; housing requirements; health insurance requirements
3. Family reunification policy variable
   - Subset 1: Legal protection of family reunification
   - Subset 2: Requirements: Duration of residence requirement; economic resources requirements; housing requirements
   - Subset 3: Eligibility: eligibility for family members in the ascending line; prohibition in case of polygamy; sequential reunification possible
4. Policies on entry for studies
   - Requirements in terms of admission; economic resources; health insurance
5. Work immigration policy
   - Subset 1: Restrictions to work immigration [-1: national employment clause; 0: list of occupations, true quotas, or authorisation necessary previous to entry; 0: more open conditions]
   - Subset 2: Access to the labour market for family members and students (during studies; after studies)

Source: IMPOL Database - Excerpts from (Mezger and Gonzalez-Ferrer 2013).
FIGURE 2: LIFETIME PROBABILITY OF MIGRATION (BETWEEN AGE 18 AND 40) FROM AFRICA, (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED FIGURES, 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS.

FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST MIGRATIONS BY DESTINATION, BY PERIOD OF DEPARTURE (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED FIGURES.
FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS WITHOUT RESIDENCE PERMIT DURING THEIR FIRST YEAR IN THE COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE, BY PERIOD OF FIRST ARRIVAL (1975-2008). BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.

TABLE 1: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS BY ORIGIN AND DESTINATION. BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Arrived directly (%)</th>
<th>No residence permit at arrival (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanaian</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegalese</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2: TOP-3 ROUTES (1975-2008). BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>DRC-Belgium (69.6%)</td>
<td>DRC-Angola-Belgium (4.3%)</td>
<td>DRC-France-Belgium (4.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>DRC-UK (55.0%)</td>
<td>DRC-Belgium-UK (8.0%)</td>
<td>DRC-France-UK (6.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanaian</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Ghana-UK (75.8%)</td>
<td>Ghana-Nigeria-UK (9.5%)</td>
<td>Ghana-Germany-UK (5.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Ghana-Netherlands (66.0%)</td>
<td>Ghana-Germany-Netherlands (6.4%)</td>
<td>Ghana-Italy-Netherlands (5.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegalese</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Senegal-France (79.2%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Spain-France (1.0%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Morocco-France (2.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Senegal-Italy (68.8%)</td>
<td>Senegal-France-Italy (14.7%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Spain-Italy (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Senegal-Spain (63.8%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Morocco-Spain (8.8%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Italy-Spain (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS AT ARRIVAL AND AT SURVEY TIME, BY ORIGIN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Country of destination</th>
<th>At arrival</th>
<th>At time of survey</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>UK, The Netherlands</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Belgium, UK</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>France, Italy, Spain</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legal status is defined by the type of residence permit during the first year. Undocumented migrants at arrival are those who declared that, during the first year in the country of residence, they did not have a residence permit at some point. This is not synonymous for illegal entry: a person may have entered legally, with a visa that expired.

Biographic data, weighted percentages.
FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF ROUTES USED BY 90% OF THE MIGRANTS, BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL (1975-2008). BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WEIGHTED FIGURES.

FIGURE 6: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS WHO TRAVELLED BY SEA AT SOME STAGE IN THE JOURNEY FROM AFRICA TO THE COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE SURVEY, BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL (1975-2008). BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WEIGHTED FIGURES.
FIGURE 7: PROBABILITY OF RETURNING WITHIN 10 YEARS OF FIRST DEPARTURE, (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED FIGURES, 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS.
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[TO BE COMPLETED AND RE-ORDERED]


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